Truthmakers and modality |
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Authors: | Ross Paul Cameron |
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Institution: | (1) School of Philosophy, University of Leeds, Woodhouse Lane, Leeds, LS2 9JT, UK |
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Abstract: | This paper attempts to locate, within an actualist ontology, truthmakers for modal truths: truths of the form <Possibly, p>
or <Necessarily, p>. In Sect. 1 I motivate the demand for substantial truthmakers for modal truths. In Sect. 2 I criticise
Armstrong’s account of truthmakers for modal truths. In Sect. 3 I examine essentialism and defend an account of what makes
essentialist attributions true, but I argue that this does not solve the problem of modal truth in general. In Sect. 4 I discuss,
and dismiss, a theistic account of the source of modal truth proposed by Alexander Pruss. In Sect. 5 I offer a means of (dis)solving
the problem. |
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Keywords: | Truthmakers Modality |
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