WARRANTED ASSERTIBILITY AND THE NORMS OF ASSERTORIC PRACTICE: WHY TRUTH AND WARRANTED ASSERTIBILITY ARE NOT COINCIDENT NORMS

Crispin Wright has argued that truth and warranted assertibility are coincident but non‐co‐extensive norms of assertoric practice and that this fact inflates deflationary theories of truth. Wright's inflationary argument has generated much discussion in the literature. By contrast, relatively little has been said about the coincidence claim that is the focus of this paper. Wright's argument for the claim that truth and warranted assertibility are coincident norms is first presented. It is then suggested that the argument trades on an ambiguity in ‘justified’ and ‘warrantedly assertible’. Finally, it is argued that, once the ambiguity is removed, there is reason to reject the claim that truth and epistemic warrant are coincident norms of assertoric practice. One important result is that no epistemic theory of truth can satisfy what Wright takes to be a key platitude about assertion.