An Alternative Model of Political Reasoning

The primary instrument of dispute management in political liberalism is a form of political thinking and talking that tries to reconcile opposed positions with an impartial settlement based on fair arrangements and mutual respect, one that is careful to treat rival views equitably, and reasoned through from start to finish with open methods that lead to a public justification understandable to the disputants. But this model of reasoning is notoriously deficient in resolving disputes among radically different communities. A more effective form of political reasoning for these disputes that yet respects the background values of liberalism is found in the languages of state depicted in realist accounts of international relations. These languages avoid liberal appeals to be reasonable, reciprocity controlled by moral criteria, and the quest for common reasons. They represent a deliberative search for an accord that will meet the interests of the disputing parties as they define these interests and understand the settlements, and in this sense are welcome models to manage divisive issues in pluralist democracies. A complete version of political reasoning would contain both liberal and realpolitik models and a mechanism to adjudicate the appropriate uses of each model.I do not know how even to begin thanking my spring 2003 graduate seminar for the wonderful discussions that allowed me to refine my thinking on this research project. In different ways the following individual members of the seminar were helpful: Amanda Dipaolo, Dimitria Gatzia, Michael McFall, Michael McKeon, Roald Nashi, Paul Prescott, Joshua Vermette, Amy Widestrom, and the two regular auditors, Cyril Ghosh and Darrell Driver. I have also profited from numerous discussions with other graduate students, including, early in this project, Steven Benko and, more constantly, Ali Shomali. Faculty colleagues who have commented on the work and suggested literatures for me to read and references to track include James Bennett, Hans Schmidt, Peg Hermann, Elizabeth Cohen, Jim Watts, Jim Wiggins, David Miller and Thomas Green. I am particularly grateful to Everita Silina, a graduate student who has been a constant friend and invaluable research assistant for the past five years. The Miami International Relations Theory group provided a critical venue to try out portions of this paper at the University of Miami campus on April 23, 2004. I then presented a later version of the paper to a Philosophy Department colloquium at the University of Miami on April 22, 2005. The comments made by those who attended one or both of the sessions were very helpful. I am also grateful to Ken Baynes and Ned McClennen for allowing me to be an unlisted third instructor in their seminar on “law, economics and public reason” in the fall semester 2004 at Syracuse University, and for the opportunity to present some of this work at one of the seminar meetings. If anything demonstrates the importance of a good collective setting on intellectual work this seminar was one such demonstration.