The Limits of Reproductive Decisions |
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Authors: | Email author" target="_blank">GED?M?MURTAGHEmail author |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Applied Social Sciences, London Metropolitan University, Ladbroke House 62-66 Highbury Grove, London, NS 2AD, UK |
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Abstract: | In this article I will address the question of determining the moral limits of reproductive decisions. In so doing I will
examine the contributions made by John Harris, who has over the years consistently addressed the ethical implications of advancing
reproductive technologies. In addressing these matters, Harris has centred his arguments on the principle of harm and with
this in mind has set out a specific theoretical framework from which decisions about disability and causing harm, as in the
case of reproductive decisions, can be rationally addressed. This discussion will attempt to question the conceptual scheme
that he proposes. The aim here is not to present an alternative theoretical contribution to the morality of reproductive choice.
Rather, in the attempt to follow some of the directives in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, the aim is to demonstrate some
of the pitfalls of what Wittgenstein has described as the “craving for generality” in contemporary philosophy. I propose that
this craving can distort, in this instance, our ordinary usage of concepts such as harm, suffering and disability and their
role in the moral vocabulary of reproductive decision making |
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Keywords: | ethics harm Harris John moral action reproduction |
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