Reliabilism in philosophy |
| |
| Authors: | Sanford C. Goldberg |
| |
| Affiliation: | (1) Department of Philosophy, Northwestern University, Crowe 3-179, 1880 Campus Drive, Evanston, IL 60208-2214, USA |
| |
| Abstract: | The following three propositions appear to be individually defensible but jointly inconsistent: (1) reliability is a necessary condition on epistemic justification; (2) on contested matters in philosophy, my beliefs are not reliably formed; (3) some of these beliefs are epistemically justified. I explore the nature and scope of the problem, examine and reject some candidate solutions, compare the issue with ones arising in discussions about disagreement, and offer a brief assessment of our predicament. |
| |
| Keywords: | Reliabilism Disagreement Philosophical methodology |
| 本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录！ |
|
