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On the Pragmatic Explanation of Concessive Knowledge Attributions

Authors:	Hagit Benbaji

Institution:	Ben-Gurion University, Israel Hagit Benbaji is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel. Her research and teaching interests include topics in philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and philosophy of perception. Among her publications are papers in Synthese (“Constitution and the Explanatory Gap”), in Canadian Journal of Philosophy (“Token Monism, Event Dualism and Overdetermination”), and in European Journal of Philosophy (“Is Thomas Reid a Direct Realist about Perception?”).

Abstract:	On Lewis's reading, fallibilism is the contradictory view that it is possible that S knows that p, even though S cannot eliminate some remote scenarios in which not-p. The pragmatic strategy is to make the alleged contradiction a mere pragmatic implicature, which is explained by false conversational expectations. I argue that the pragmatic strategy fails.

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