The Solution to the Surprise Exam Paradox |
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| Authors: | Ken Levy |
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| Affiliation: | Louisiana State University Law Center Ken Levy is transitioning from Climenko Fellow at Harvard Law School to Assistant Professor at Louisiana State University Law Center. He received a PhD in philosophy from Rutgers University in 1999 and a JD from Columbia Law School in 2002. His recent publications include “The Rationalist Solution to Gregory Kavka's Toxin Puzzle” (Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2009), “Killing, Letting Die, and the Case for Mildly Punishing Bad Samaritanism” (Georgia Law Review, forthcoming 2010), “The Solution to the Real Blackmail Paradox: The Common Link Between Blackmail and Other Criminal Threats” (Connecticut Law Review), and “Baumann on the Monty Hall Problem and Single-Case Probabilities” (Synthese). |
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| Abstract: | The Surprise Exam Paradox continues to perplex and torment despite the many solutions that have been offered. This paper proposes to end the intrigue once and for all by refuting one of the central pillars of the Surprise Exam Paradox, the “No Friday Argument,” which concludes that an exam given on the last day of the testing period cannot be a surprise. This refutation consists of three arguments, all of which are borrowed from the literature: the “Unprojectible Announcement Argument,” the “Wright & Sudbury Argument,” and the “Epistemic Blindspot Argument.” The reason that the Surprise Exam Paradox has persisted this long is not because any of these arguments is problematic. On the contrary, each of them is correct. The reason that it has persisted so long is because each argument is only part of the solution. The correct solution requires all three of them to be combined together. Once they are, we may see exactly why the No Friday Argument fails and therefore why we have a solution to the Surprise Exam Paradox that should stick. |
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