Fictionalism and the attitudes |
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Authors: | Chris John Daly |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Philosophy, Manchester University, Dover Street, Manchester, Greater Manchester, M13 9PL, UK |
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Abstract: | This paper distinguishes revolutionary fictionalism from other forms of fictionalism and also from other philosophical views. The paper takes fictionalism about mathematical objects and fictionalism about scientific unobservables as illustrations. The paper evaluates arguments that purport to show that this form of fictionalism is incoherent on the grounds that there is no tenable distinction between believing a sentence and taking the fictionalist's distinctive attitude to that sentence. The argument that fictionalism about mathematics is ‘comically immodest’ is also evaluated. In place of those arguments, an argument against fictionalism about abstract objects of any kind is presented in the last section. This argument takes the form of a trilemma against the fictionalist. |
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Keywords: | Fictionalism Belief Acceptance |
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