Direct phenomenal beliefs,cognitive significance,and the specious present |
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Authors: | Ted Poston |
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Affiliation: | 1. Department of Philosophy, University of South Alabama, 5991 Dr N. RM 124, Mobile, AL, 36688, USA
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Abstract: | Chalmers (The character of consciousness, 2010) argues for an acquaintance theory of the justification of direct phenomenal beliefs. A central part of this defense is the claim that direct phenomenal beliefs are cognitively significant. I argue against this. Direct phenomenal beliefs are justified within the specious present, and yet the resources available with the present ‘now’ are so impoverished that it barely constrains the content of a direct phenomenal belief. I argue that Chalmers’s account does not have the resources for explaining how direct phenomenal beliefs support the inference from ‘this E is R’ to ‘that was R.’ |
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