Philosophical foundations of partial belief models |
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Institution: | 1. Neurology Department, Pitié-Salpêtrière Hospital, Assistance publique–Hôpitaux de Paris, 75013 Paris, France;2. Internal Medicine Department, Institute, Pitié-Salpêtrière Hospital, Assistance publique–Hôpitaux de Paris, 47-83, boulevard de l’Hôpital, 75013 Paris, France;3. Paris VI University, 75013 Paris, France;4. Neuroradiology Department, Pitié-Salpêtrière Hospital, 75013 Paris, France |
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Abstract: | This paper is an attempt to put forward a new kind of partial model for representing belief states. I first introduce some philosophical motivations for working with partial models. Then, I present the standard (total) model proposed by Hintikka, and the partial models studied by Humberstone and Holliday. I then show how to reduce Hintikka’s semantics in order to obtain a partial model which, however, differs from Humberstone’s and Holliday’s. The nature of such differences is assessed, and I provide motivations for using the newly proposed semantics rather than the existing ones. Finally, I review some promising philosophical applications of the ideas developed throughout the discussion. |
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Keywords: | Belief representation Epistemic logic Partiality Possible doxastic worlds |
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