A demonstration of the costs and benefits of expertise in recognition memory

In their area of expertise experts know more potentially interfering facts than nonexperts do, yet their memory IS superior to that of nonexperts. This has been termed the “paradox of interference.” We proposed that the ability of experts to go beyond the information given allows them to infer the presence of items that might not otherwise be remembered. However, such inferences can also be detrimental to accurate recognition memory in that such inferences might become confused with actual targets. We examined the benefits and costs of expertise in two recognition memory experiments In which experts and nonexperts participated. Experts in Ex-penment 1 were knowledgeable about baseball; those in Experiment 2 were knowledgeable about Ohio geography. Distractors in both studies bore a synonymous, an inferential, or no special relation to the targets. In the last instance, experts had recognition memory superior to that of the nonexperts. When the distractors were related to the targets, however, the non-experts were superior. We proposed that experts' inferential behavior is a contributor to their generally superior memory, but that task demands can convert this asset into a liability.