Inductive Incompleteness |
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Authors: | Matthias Hild |
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Institution: | (1) Darden Business School, 100 Darden Blvd, Charlottesville, VA 22903-1760, USA |
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Abstract: | Nelson Goodman cast the ‘problem of induction’ as the task of articulating the principles and standards by which to distinguish
valid from invalid inductive inferences. This paper explores some logical bounds on the ability of a rational reasoner to
accomplish this task. By a simple argument, either an inductive inference method cannot admit its own fallibility, or there
exists some non-inferable hypothesis whose non-inferability the method cannot infer (violating the principle of ‘negative
introspection’). The paper discusses some implications of this limited self-knowledge for the justifiability of inductive
inferences, auto-epistemic logic, and the epistemic foundations of game theory. |
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