Against intentionalism |
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Authors: | Bernard Nickel |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, M.I.T., Cambridge, MA, 02139 |
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Abstract: | Intentionalism is the claim that the phenomenological properties of a perceptual experience supervene on its intentional properties.
The paper presents a counter-example to this claim, one that concerns visual grouping phenomenology. I argue that this example
is superior to superficially similar examples involving grouping phenomenology offered by Peacocke (Sense and Content, Oxford: Oxford University Press), because the standard intentionalist responses to Peacocke’s examples cannot be extended
to mine. If Intentionalism fails, it is impossible to reduce the phenomenology of an experience to its content. |
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