Choosing the realist framework |
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Authors: | Stathis Psillos |
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Institution: | (1) Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge, Free School Lane, Cambridge, CB2 3RH, UK |
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Abstract: | There has been an empiricist tradition in the core of Logical Positivism/Empiricism, starting with Moritz Schlick and ending
in Herbert Feigl (via Hans Reichenbach), according to which the world of empiricism need not be a barren place devoid of all
the explanatory entities posited by scientific theories. The aim of this paper is to articulate this tradition and to explore
ways in which its key elements can find a place in the contemporary debate over scientific realism. It presents a way empiricism
can go for scientific realism without metaphysical anxiety, by developing an indispensability argument for the adoption of
the realist framework. This argument, unlike current realist arguments, has a pragmatic ring to it: there is no ultimate argument for the adoption of the realist framework. |
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