A Brief History of Ghosts: Commentary on Paper by Laurel Moldawsky Silber

Although Gerhardt's commentary points to substantial points of agreement between us—the claim that human being is embodied being, the critique of rationalisms, and the resistance to relativisms—we also have important differences. The chief of these, from my point of view, concern (1) the functions of theoretical language, (2) the level of commitment psychoanalysts owe to traditional language for the sake of community and continuity, and (3) the issue of reification. My reply suggests that Gerhardt has confused the functions of expressive and theoretical language; that, for the sake of a “gossipy connection,” she seems to deprive the psychoanalytic community of the self-reflective criticism of its own shared assumptions; and that there is a difference between metaphor and the misplaced concreteness that is sometimes called reification.