| Abstract: | Prior research has demonstrated that allocators frequently distribute lesser rewards to employees with constrained mobility, and that this tendency is more pronounced among more competent employees. This phenomenon is termed "rational selective exploitation." This allocation rule is rational in that it serves to maintain membership among the most desirable group members–those who contribute most to the group's task goals–but is exploitative in that it produces an erosion of equity: Although deserving of high rewards, the outcomes of competent but entrapped employees are lower than those of their counterparts with greater mobility. Four experiments tested several predictions concerning reward allocation processes. First, allocators distributed greater rewards to more competent employees. This tendency was more pronounced under conditions of instrumental allocator orientation than under conditions of social-emotional orientation. Second, allocators distributed greater rewards to more mobile employees. This tendency was more pronounced under conditions of instrumental orientation and constrained labor pool, and was weakly promoted by the anticipation of future allocations. Third, employee competence and employee mobility interacted; the tendency to allocate greater rewards to more mobile employees was especially pronounced among highly competent employees. This interaction of competence with mobility–the rational selective exploitation effect–was stronger under conditions of instrumental allocator orientation than under conditions of greater social-emotional concern, and was weakly promoted by the anticipation of future allocations. |
