Empiricism,judgment, and argument; Toward an informal logic of science |
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Authors: | Maurice A Finocchiaro |
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Institution: | (1) Dept. of Philosophy, University of Nevada at Las Vegas, 89154 Las Vegas, Nevada, USA |
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Abstract: | In an attempt to explore the role of argumentation in scientific inquiry, I explore the conception of argument that appears fruitful in the light of the recent trends in the philosophy of science, away from logical empiricism, and toward a greater emphasis on change, disagreement, and history. I begin by contrasting typical instances philosopers theories of both empiricism and apriorism, with typical instances of scientists uses of these two attitudes, suggesting that such practice shows a judiciousness lacking in epistemological theory. Then I examine at some length three important version of scientific judgement, namely Einstein's opportunism, Boltzmann's pluralism, and Huygens's eclecticism. I go on to discuss some recent work in the philosophy of science, exploring connections between the notion of judgment and Feyerabend's anarchism, Harold Brown's view of rationality, and Dudley Shapere's analysis of scientific change. All of this suggests a notion of argument in the sense of informallogic, and I examine some aspects of Galileo's work in its terms. |
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Keywords: | Informal logic judgment methodologies patterns of argumentation |
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