Intuitions are inclinations to believe |
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| Authors: | Joshua Earlenbaugh Bernard Molyneux |
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| Institution: | (1) University of California—Davis, One Shields Avenue, 1235 Social Science and Humanities, Davis, CA 95616, USA;(2) University of California—Davis, One Shields Avenue, 2292 Social Science and Humanities, Davis, CA 95616, USA |
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| Abstract: | Advocates of the use of intuitions in philosophy argue that they are treated as evidence because they are evidential. Their
opponents agree that they are treated as evidence, but argue that they should not be so used, since they are the wrong kinds
of things. In contrast to both, we argue that, despite appearances, intuitions are not treated as evidence in philosophy whether
or not they should be. Our positive account is that intuitions are a subclass of inclinations to believe. Our thesis explains
why intuitions play a role in persuasion and inquiry, without conceding that they are evidential. The account also makes predictions
about the structure of intuitions that are confirmed by independent arguments.
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| Keywords: | Intuitions Evidence Methodology Inclinations A priori |
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