Sense of agency for mental actions: Insights from a belief-based action-effect paradigm |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona, Spain;2. Center for Brain and Cognition and Department of Information and Communications Technologies, Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona, Spain;1. Department of Neuroscience Imaging and Clinical Sciences, G. D''Annunzio University of Chieti-Pescara, Chieti 66100, Italy;2. Department of Psychological Sciences, G d’Annunzio University of Chieti-Pescara, Chieti, Italy;3. Institute for Advanced Biomedical Technologies (ITAB), G d’Annunzio University of Chieti-Pescara, Chieti, Italy;1. Pharmacology, Pharmacy & Anaesthesiology Unit, School of Medicine and Pharmacology, Faculty of Medicine, Dentistry and Health Sciences, The University of Western Australia, WA, Australia;2. Statewide Department of Neurophysiology, Graylands Hospital, North Metropolitan Health Services – Mental Health, WA, Australia;3. School of Psychology, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK;4. School of Psychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences, Faculty of Medicine, Dentistry and Health Sciences, The University of Western Australia, WA, Australia;5. Clinical Research Centre, Graylands Hospital, North Metropolitan Health Services – Mental Health, WA, Australia;1. Beijing Key Lab of Applied Experimental Psychology, Faculty of Psychology, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, China;2. State Key Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience and Learning & IDG/McGovern Institute for Brain Research, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, China;3. National Key Laboratory of Human Factors Engineering, China Astronaut Research and Training Center, Beijing, China;4. School of Foreign Languages, Beijing Institute of Technology, Zhuhai, China |
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| Abstract: | A substantial body of research has converged on the idea that the sense of agency arises from the integration of multiple sources of information. In this study, we investigated whether a measurable sense of agency can be detected for mental actions, without the contribution of motor components. We used a fake action-effect paradigm, where participants were led to think that a motor action or a particular thought could trigger a sound. Results showed that the sense of agency, when measured through explicit reports, was of comparable strength for motor and mental actions. The intentional binding effect, a phenomenon typically associated with the experience of agency, was also observed for both motor and mental actions. Taken together, our results provide novel insights into the specific role of intentional cues in instantiating a sense of agency, even in the absence of motor signals. |
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| Keywords: | Sense of agency Intentional binding Brain-computer interface Mental action Motor action |
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