Cognition in moral space: A minimal model |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Department of English, Clemson University, 815 Strode Tower, Clemson, SC 29631, United States;2. Department of Physics, Emory University, Atlanta, GA 30322, United States;3. Department of Environmental Systems Sciences, ETH Zürich, 8092 Zürich, Switzerland;4. Department of Environmental Microbiology, Eawag 8600 Dübendorf, Switzerland;1. Centre of Behavioural and Cognitive Sciences, University of Allahabad, Allahabad, India;2. Department of Cognitive Science, Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur, Kanpur, India;1. Department of Psychology and Cognitive Science, University of Trento, Italy;2. Department of Psychology, University of Oslo, Norway;3. Department of Psychology, The University of Chicago, United States;4. Department of Economics and Management, University of Trento, Italy;5. Centre for Decision Research, Leeds University Business School, University of Leeds, United Kingdom |
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| Abstract: | We describe moral cognition as a process occurring in a distinctive cognitive space, wherein moral relationships are defined along several morally relevant dimensions. After identifying candidate dimensions, we show how moral judgments can emerge in this space directly from object perception, without any appeal to moral rules or abstract values. Our reductive “minimal model” (Batterman & Rice, 2014) elaborates Beal’s (2020) claim that moral cognition is determined, at the most basic level, by “ontological frames” defining subjects, objects, and the proper relation between them. We expand this claim into a set of formal hypotheses that predict moral judgments based on how objects are “framed” in the relevant dimensions of “moral space.” |
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| Keywords: | Minimal model Moral cognition Moral psychology Moral relationship Moral space Ontological framing |
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