Direct and indirect freedom in addiction: Folk free will and blame judgments are sensitive to the choice history of drug users |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Department of Epidemiology, Graduate School of Public Health, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, USA;2. School of Epidemiology and Public Health, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, ON, Canada;1. Yale School of Medicine, Yale University, New Haven, CT, United States of America;2. Yale College, Yale University, New Haven, CT, United States of America;3. Yale Divinity School, Yale University, New Haven, CT, United States of America;1. Yale School of Public Health, Department of Health Policy and Management, Address: 60 College St, 3rd fl, New Haven, CT 06510, United States;2. Wayne State University School of Social Work, 5447 Woodward Ave, Detroit, MI 48202, United States;1. Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO, USA;2. University of Missouri School of Law, Columbia, MO, USA |
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| Abstract: | People view addiction as a source of diminished free will and moral responsibility. Yet, people are also sensitive to the personal histories of moral actors, including, perhaps, the way by which people became addicted. Across two studies (N = 806), we compare people’s moral intuitions about cases in which the actor becomes addicted by force or by choice. We find that perceptions of reduced free will partially mediate an association between choice (vs. no choice) in addiction and moral blame for a bad act (Study 1). We replicate this pattern and show that blame judgments are stronger when the bad act is related (vs. unrelated) to obtaining the addictive substance (Study 2). Our work is novel in demonstrating that lay people evince relatively nuanced intuitions about the role of free will in addiction and morality—they track direct and indirect paths to choices when making free will and blame judgments. |
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| Keywords: | Free will Moral judgments Blame Addiction |
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