Goldman and the foundations of social epistemology |
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Authors: | J. Angelo Corlett |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona, USA |
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Abstract: | This essay argues that Alvin I. Goldman's truth-linked theory of group knowledge (veritism) omits individual components of social cognition, that all group based theories of knowledge lead to scepticism, and that if any sense is to be made of social knowledge, it must be done on individualist lines. I argue that Goldman's veritism can be reconstructed by adopting a reliabilist theory,social reliabilism. And I argue that Goldman's objections to a particular sort of consensualism are not telling. So there are now two plausible and competing theories of social knowledge-social reliabilism and consensualism.I am grateful to Keith Lehrer and Alvin Goldman for their criticisms of previous drafts of this paper. |
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Keywords: | Belief consensualism epistemology experimental social psychology social knowledge social reliabilism veritism |
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