Kantian non-conceptualism |
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Authors: | Robert Hanna |
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Affiliation: | (1) Philosophy, University of Colorado at Boulder, Boulder, CO 80309, USA |
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Abstract: | There are perceptual states whose representational content cannot even in principle be conceptual. If that claim is true, then at least some perceptual states have content whose semantic structure and psychological function are essentially distinct from the structure and function of conceptual content. Furthermore the intrinsically “orientable” spatial character of essentially non-conceptual content entails not only that all perceptual states contain non-conceptual content in this essentially distinct sense, but also that consciousness goes all the way down into so-called unconscious or subpersonal mental states. Both my argument for the existence of essentially non-conceptual content and my theory of its structure and function have a Kantian provenance. |
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Keywords: | Non-conceptual mental content Spatial representation Concepts Consciousness Kant |
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