On the Quinean-analyticity of mathematical propositions |
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Authors: | Gregory Lavers |
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Affiliation: | 1. Department of Philosophy, Concordia University, 1455 DeMaisonneuve Blvd, Montreal, QC, H3G 1M8, Canada
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Abstract: | This paper investigates the relation between Carnap and Quine??s views on analyticity on the one hand, and their views on philosophical analysis or explication on the other. I argue that the stance each takes on what constitutes a successful explication largely dictates the view they take on analyticity. I show that although acknowledged by neither party (in fact Quine frequently expressed his agreement with Carnap on this subject) their views on explication are substantially different. I argue that this difference not only explains their differences on the question of analyticity, but points to a Quinean way to answer a challenge that Quine posed to Carnap. The answer to this challenge leads to a Quinean view of analyticity such that arithmetical truths are analytic, according to Quine??s own remarks, and set theory is at least defensibly analytic. |
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