Carnap on theoretical terms: structuralism without metaphysics |
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Authors: | Michael Friedman |
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Institution: | 1.Department of Philosophy,Stanford University,Stanford,USA |
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Abstract: | Both realists and instrumentalists have found it difficult to understand (much less accept) Carnap’s developed view on theoretical
terms, which attempts to stake out a neutral position between realism and instrumentalism. I argue that Carnap’s mature conception
of a scientific theory as the conjunction of its Ramsey sentence and Carnap sentence can indeed achieve this neutral position.
To see this, however, we need to see why the Newman problem raised in the context of recent work on structural realism is
no problem for Carnap’s conception; and we also need to locate Carnap’s work on theoretical terms within his wider program
of Wissenschaftslogik or the logic of science. |
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