Evidence, Explanation, and the Empirical Status of Scientific Realism |
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Authors: | Igor Douven |
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Institution: | (1) Institute of Philosophy, University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium |
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Abstract: | There is good reason to believe that, if it can be decided at all, the realism debate must be decided on a posteriori grounds.
But at least prima facie the prospects for an a posteriori resolution of the debate seem bleak, given that realists and antirealists
disagree over two of the most fundamental questions pertaining to any kind of empirical research, to wit, what the range of
accessible evidence is and what the methodological status of explanatory considerations is. The present paper aims to show
that, while the difficulties that face an empirical approach to the realism debate are not to be discounted, they are not
insurmountable either. Specifically, it presents a broadly Bayesian strategy for resolving the debate that is capable of solving
those difficulties. The strategy crucially involves answers to the aforementioned questions that diverge from both the standard
realist and the standard antirealist answers, but that should appear more natural and plausible than those to realists and
antirealists alike. |
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Keywords: | |
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