Paleo-Compatibilism and Buddhist Reductionism |
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Authors: | Mark Siderits |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy, Illinois State University, Campus Box 4540, Normal, IL 61790–4540, USA |
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Abstract: | Paleo-compatibilism is the view that the freedom required for moral responsibility is not incompatible with determinism about
the factors relevant to moral assessment, since the claim that we are free and the claim that the psychophysical elements
are causally determined are true in distinct and incommensurable ways. This is to be accounted for by appealing to the distinction
between conventional truth and ultimate truth developed by Buddhist Reductionists. Paleo-compatibilists hold that the illusion
of incompatibilism only arises when we illegitimately mix two distinct vocabularies, one concerned with persons, the other
concerned with the parts to which persons are reducible. I explore the view, its roots in Buddhist Reductionism, and its prospects.
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Keywords: | Compatibilism Buddhism Reductionism Semantic dualism Ś ā ntideva Moral responsibility |
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