Doings and Subject Causation |
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Authors: | Martine Nida-Rümelin |
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Institution: | (1) Université de Fribourg, Fribourg, Switzerland |
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Abstract: | In the center of this paper is a phenomenological claim: we experience ourselves in our own doings and we experience others
when we perceive them in their doings as active in the sense of being a cause of the corresponding physical event. These experiences are fundamental to the way we view ourselves
and others. It is therefore desirable for any philosophical theory to be compatible with the content of these experiences
and thus to avoid the attribution of radical and permanent error to human experience. A theory of ‘subject causation’ according
to which the active subject continuously and simultaneously causes physical changes is sketched. This account is—according
to the phenomenological claim defended—compatible with the content of our daily experiences in doing something and in observing
others in their doings and it has a number of further more theoretical advantages: it does not touch the autonomy of neurophysiology
and it is compatible with a thesis of supervenience of the mental on the physical. It does however require a weak version
of subject-body dualism.
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