Wittgenstein and the discursive analysis of emotion

This paper explores the implications of Wittgenstein's analysis of language, emotion and expression for contemporary theory and research on emotion. According to Wittgenstein, emotional expressions operate as public manifestations of emotional experience. As a result, it is meaningful to say third-person observers can “know” another's emotional experience. Building upon these ideas, a discursive approach to the analysis of emotional states is proposed. Everyday emotion words specify the public criteria that people use to “read experience off” another's emotional expressions. The identification of emotion proceeds through a dialectical process involving judgment and reflection. Observers (a) use everyday emotion words to make intuitive, pre-reflective classification of another's emotional experience; (b) reflect upon and make explicit the public criteria that mediate their implicit pre-reflective judgments; and (c) continue the judgment-reflection cycle until the meaning of the other's expressions is exhausted. The discursive approach is illustrated through an analysis of expressed emotion within psychotherapeutic dialogue.