The value of dignity in and for bioethics: rethinking the terms of the debate |
| |
Authors: | Clair Morrissey |
| |
Affiliation: | 1.Department of Philosophy,Occidental College,Los Angeles,USA |
| |
Abstract: | The discussion of the nature and value of dignity in and for bioethics concerns not only the importance of the concept but also the aims of bioethics itself. Here, I challenge the claim that the concept of dignity is useless by challenging the implicit conception of usefulness involved. I argue that the conception of usefulness that both opponents and proponents of dignity in bioethics adopt is rooted in a narrow understanding of the role of normative theory in practical ethical thinking. I then offer an alternate understanding of the nature and value of dignity. I begin by recognizing that claims that one’s dignity has been violated point to an important difference between “respect for autonomy” and “respect for persons.” I then suggest three different conceptions of how dignity can be normatively guiding for bioethics, and conclude that, ultimately, understanding dignity as the cornerstone of a reflective perspective that frames moral reflection and deliberation is valuable for doing bioethics well. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|