GAUTHIER'S ETHICS AND EXTRA-RATIONAL VALUES: A COMMENT ON DEMARCO

While the preponderance of recent literature on David Gauthier's Morals by Agreement has focused on his theory of bargaining,¹ Joseph DeMarco calls into question the foundation of Gauthier's project.² DeMarco argues that Gauthier's project depends on the incorporation of extra-rational values, thereby undermining his attempt to derive morality from the non-moral premises of rational choice. On DeMarco's account, there are at least three points where Gauthier depends on extra-rational values. DeMarco finds the first two of these points problematic because he misunderstands Gauthier's theory of rational choice. The third point is more serious; Gauthier does not offer an apparatus sufficient to respond to DeMarco's charge. To disarm DeMarco's third objection, I shall offer a justification of the rationality of autonomous preference formation.