Evaluating models of remember-know judgments: Complexity, mimicry, and discriminability |
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Authors: | Andrew L. Cohen Caren M. Rotello Neil A. Macmillan |
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Affiliation: | University of Massachusetts, Department of Psychology, Amherst, Massachusetts 01003-7710, USA. acohen@psych.umass.edu |
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Abstract: | Remember-know judgments provide additional information in recognition memory tests, but the nature of this information and the attendant decision process are in dispute. Competing models have proposed that remember judgments reflect a sum of familiarity and recollective information (the one-dimensional model), are based on a difference between these strengths (STREAK), or are purely recollective (the dual-process model). A choice among these accounts is sometimes made by comparing the precision of their fits to data, but this strategy may be muddied by differences in model complexity: Some models that appear to provide good fits may simply be better able to mimic the data produced by other models. To evaluate this possibility, we simulated data with each of the models in each of three popular remember-know paradigms, then fit those data to each of the models. We found that the one-dimensional model is generally less complex than the others, but despite this handicap, it dominates the others as the best-fitting model. For both reasons, the one-dimensional model should be preferred. In addition, we found that some empirical paradigms are ill-suited for distinguishing among models. For example, data collected by soliciting remember/know/new judgments--that is, the trinary task--provide a particularly weak ground for distinguishing models. Additional tables and figures may be downloaded from the Psychonomic Society's Archive of Norms, Stimuli, and Data, at www.psychonomic.org/archive. |
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