| Abstract: | It has generally been assumed that increases in the concrete outcomes of a procedure will result in judgments of greater procedural and distributive fairness, but research on this topic has been inconsistent. Using a classic procedural justice paradigm (Walker, LaTour, Lind, &. Thibaut, 1974), the experiment tested the effects of four levels of outcome. Forty-eight male and female undergraduates were led to believe that their team had been wrongfully charged with cheating in a business simulation game. An adversary adjudication was held, purportedly to resolve the charge. The outcome of the adjudication was confiscation of all, two thirds, one third, or none of the subject's monetary winnings from the game. Both procedural and distributive fairness measures showed dear nonlinear outcome effects. The relationship between outcomes and both fairness measures showed some evidence of being nonmonotonic as well: A two-thirds loss resulted in less favorable reactions than did a total loss. Ratings on other scales suggest that the nonlinear effects are due to beliefs that the judge did not fully consider the evidence in the two-thirds loss and one-third loss conditions. The discussion focuses on the theoretical implications of the findings for procedural justice and social exchange processes and the practical implications for conflict resolution procedure. |
