| Abstract: | The present study simulated an organizational dispute to test 12 hypotheses about mediator behavior that were derived from the strategic choice model of mediation. This model is based on the assumption that mediators have four basic strategies to resolve disputes: (a) integrate, which involves a search for mutually acceptable outcomes; (b) press, which involves lowering one or both parties' aspirations; (c) compensate, which involves offering positive benefits in exchange for concessions; and (d) inaction, which involves letting the parties handle the dispute by themselves. The major proposition of the model is that two factors, the mediator's assessment of the likelihood of a mutually acceptable agreement and the mediator's concern for the parties' aspirations, interact to predict mediator behavior. Nine of the 12 hypotheses derived from the model were supported. Pressing by mediators occurred most when mediators had a low estimate of the likelihood of agreement in combination with a low concern for the parties' aspirations. Compensating occurred most when mediators had a low estimate of the likelihood of agreement in combination with a high concern for the parties' aspirations. Inaction occurred most when the mediators' estimate of the likelihood of agreement was high and their concern for the parties' aspirations was low. Integrating occurred most when the mediators had a high concern for the parties' aspirations. |
