Artistic Value and Copies of Artworks

In a recent paper, Nicholas Stang argues that (i) artworks are not valuable for their own sake in virtue of their artistic value, (ii) artworks have artistic value in virtue of the final value of the experiences they afford, and (iii) the only appropriate objects of appreciation are worktypes. All of these arguments rest on claims about the artistic value of copies of artworks that provide a radical challenge to the views that many philosophers have about copies. Here I argue that Stang's arguments are unsuccessful. The argument for (i) is mistaken about what one is committed to if one thinks artworks are valuable for their own sake in virtue of their artistic value. The defense of (ii) fails to explain what it is supposed to explain. The argument for (iii) overgeneralizes from one kind of case. Finally, the basic claim Stang makes about the artistic value of copies is false. I defend an alternative view. I conclude by discussing the implications of my arguments for experientialism (thesis (ii)). Reflection on the cases Stang considers, far from leading us to embrace experientialism, in fact reveals problems that experientialists need to confront.