Inductivism and probabilism

Synopsis I I set out my view that all inference is essentially deductive and pinpoint what I take to be the major shortcomings of the induction rule.II The import of data depends on the probability model of the experiment, a dependence ignored by the induction rule. Inductivists admit background knowledge must be taken into account but never spell out how this is to be done. As I see it, that is the problem of induction.III The induction rule, far from providing a method of discovery, does not even serve to detect pattern. Knowing that there is uniformity in the universe is no help to discovering laws. A critique of Reichenbach's justification of the straight rule is constructed along these lines.IV The induction rule, by itself, cannot account for the varying rates at which confidence in an hypothesis mounts with data. The mathematical analysis of this salient feature of inductive reasoning requires prior probabilities. We also argue, against orthodox statisticians, that prior probabilities make a substantive contribution to the objectivity of inductive methods, viz. to the design of experiments and the selection of decision rules.V Carnap's general criticisms of various estimation rules, like the straight rule and the impervious rule, are seen to be misguided when the prior densities to which they correspond are taken into account.VI Analysis of Hempel's definition of confirmation qua formalization of the enumerative (naive) conception of instancehood. We show that from the standpoint of the quantitative measure P(H/E):P(H) for the degree to which E confirms H, Hempel's classificatory concept yields correct results only for sampling at large from a finite population with a two-way classification all of whose compositions are equally probable. We extend the analysis to Goodman's paradox, finding cases in which grue-like hypotheses do receive as much confirmation as their opposite numbers. We argue, moreover, the irrelevancy of entrenchment, and maintain that Goodman's paradox is no more than a straightforward counter-example to the enumerative conception of instancehood embodied in Hempel's definition.VII We rebutt the objection that prior probabilities, qua inputs of Bayesian analysis, can only be obtained by enumerative induction (insofar as they are objective). The divergence in the prior densities of two rational agents is less a function of subjectivity, we maintain, than of vagueness.VIII Our concluding remarks stress that, for Bayesians, there is no problem of induction in the usual sense.