Virtue Ethics, Theory, and Warrant |
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Authors: | Garrett Cullity |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Moral Philosophy, University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews, Fife, KY16 9AL, Scotland E-mail |
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Abstract: | Are there good grounds for thinking that the moral values of action are to be derived from those of character? This ‘virtue ethical’ claim is sometimes thought of as a kind of normative ethical theory; sometimes as form of opposition to any such theory. However, the best case to be made for it supports neither of these claims. Rather, it leads us to a distinctive view in moral epistemology: the view that my warrant for a particular moral judgement derives from my warrant for believing that I am a good moral judge. This view seems to confront a regress-problem. For the belief that I am a good moral judge is itself a particular moral judgement. So it seems that, on this view, I need to derive my warrant for believing that I am a good moral judge from my warrant for believing that I am a good judge of moral judges; and so on. I show how this worry can be met, and trace the implications of the resulting view for warranted moral judgement. |
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Keywords: | virtue ethics ethical theory moral epistemology moral judgement |
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