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名利博弈中的舍利取义行为
引用本文:谈晨皓,王逸博,崔诣晨,王沛. 名利博弈中的舍利取义行为[J]. 心理科学进展, 2016, 24(12): 1907-1916. DOI: 10.3724/SP.J.1042.2016.01907
作者姓名:谈晨皓  王逸博  崔诣晨  王沛
作者单位:(;1.上海师范大学教育学院心理系, 上海 200234) (;2.南京师范大学心理学院, 南京 210097) (;3.南京林业大学思想政治理论教学研究部, 南京 210037)
基金项目:2012年国家社科基金重点项目
摘    要:名利博弈是在名与利不可兼得的情境下对名利进行取舍的决策。在名利博弈中, 人们往往表现出舍利取义的行为倾向。竞争性利他理论主张舍利取义是一种吸引他人对自己“投资”的获利策略。名利博弈的博弈对象具有的身份信息会对博弈者舍利取义的行为倾向产生影响。身份中所蕴涵的以能力为代表的客观回应潜力限定了获取名声可带来利益的上限, 以社会距离为代表的主观回应潜力反映着个体主观认为他人向自己提供利益的可能。两者共同影响着名利博弈中舍利取义的产生, 成为名利博弈倾向的核心影响因素。未来研究应从博弈对象的主、客观回应潜力出发, 关注详细身份、具体身份、模糊身份等三个层面, 进一步验证名利博弈影响因素的普遍性, 为名利博弈内部机制的建构与验证提供更为坚实的实证依据。

关 键 词:名利博弈   名声   竞争性利他   社会身份  
收稿时间:2014-04-03

The profit sacrificing tendency of reputation-profit game
TAN Chenhao,WANG Yibo,CUI Yichen,WANG Pei. The profit sacrificing tendency of reputation-profit game[J]. Advances In Psychological Science, 2016, 24(12): 1907-1916. DOI: 10.3724/SP.J.1042.2016.01907
Authors:TAN Chenhao  WANG Yibo  CUI Yichen  WANG Pei
Affiliation:(;1. Department of Psychology, Shanghai Normal University, Shanghai 200234, China) (;2. School of Psychology, Nanjing Normal University, Nanjing 210097, China) (;3. Institute of Ideological and Political Education, Nanjing Forestry University, Nanjing 210037, China)
Abstract:A situation in which one must make a choice between his reputation and profit is so called a reputation-profit game. Individual usually tends to sacrifice their profit to obtain reputation in this kind of game. Competitive altruism theory regards the reputation obtaining behavior as a strategy with which one can attract investor’s interest to gain more profit from the investment in the future. The identity of the observer would affect the degree of gamer’s tendency of reputation obtaining behavior. According to the purpose of reputation, observer’s objective capacity to pay back the investment of reputation (e.g. ability) which would decide the upper limit of the possible benefits in the future and observer’s subjective capacity to pay back the investment of reputation (e.g. social distance) which means the degree to which the gamer believes the observer would give him the chance would affect the generating of reputation obtaining behavior jointly. And these two capacities should be viewed as core factors which would decide the tendency of the game. Based on these two core factors, three levels of identity information (detailed/specific/ambiguous identity) should be taken seriously in future researches to verify the effectiveness of these two factors and provide empirical evidences for the construction of the mechanism of reputation-profit game.
Keywords:reputation-profit game  reputation  competitive altruism  social identity
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