Analytic philosophy challenged. Scepticism and arguing transcendentally |
| |
Authors: | Márta Ujvári |
| |
Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy, Budapest University of Economic Sciences, Fövám tér 8, H-1093 Budapest, Ungarn |
| |
Abstract: | Analytic philosophy has recently been challenged from a perspective advocated by Richard Rorty: this favours edifying philosophy against systematic philosophy comprising also analytic philosophy. In Rorty's presentation analytic philosophy is one more variant of the Cartesian—Kantian epistemology which, being committed to a permanent framework of inquiry rooted in our human subjectivity, implies the uniqueness of one conceptual scheme.Against this tenet I argue in two ways. First, I show that analytic philosophy of mind and language with the Fregean background and possible world semantics implies the pluralism of conceptual schemes on logical-conventionalist grounds. Secondly, I show that although analytic philosophy shares the claim for legitimation of a conceptual scheme with Kantian epistemology, it is critical of the latter in that the uniqueness-claim is refuted.In connection with legitimation the relation of analytic philosophy to scepticism is also discussed. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|