Wittgensteinian Pragmatism in Humean Concepts |
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Authors: | David Hommen |
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Affiliation: | 1.Institut für Philosophie,Heinrich-Heine-Universit?t Düsseldorf,Düsseldorf,Germany |
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Abstract: | David Hume’s and later Ludwig Wittgenstein’s views on concepts are generally presented as standing in stark opposition to each other. In a nutshell, Hume’s theory of concepts is taken to be subjectivistic and atomistic, while Wittgenstein is metonymic with a broadly pragmatistic and holistic doctrine that gained much attention during the second half of the 20th century. In this essay, I shall argue, however, that Hume’s theory of concepts is indeed much more akin to the views of (post-Tractarian) Wittgenstein and his epigones than many, including Wittgenstein himself, probably might have suspected. As I try to show, Hume anticipates many themes central to Wittgenstein’s writings on language and meaning, and actually takes initial steps towards both an anti-subjectivistic and anti-atomistic psychology and epistemology. |
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