Critical remarks on Rawls's burdens of judgement

I examine the role of the burdens of judgement argument in Rawls's defence of the claim that liberalism cannot be based on a comprehensive doctrine. According to Rawls, the burdens of judgement make it very unlikely that most individuals can agree on anything more than a purely political morality. I argue that the argument does not succeed. I concentrate on the last three burdens which are specifically about problems of reaching normative agreement. Firstly, I argue that Rawls's claim that modern society inevitably gives rise to a diversity of values is not convincing since for every claim of divergence a counterclaim of convergence can be provided. Secondly, I provide examples of plausible agreement on partial comprehensive doctrines. Thirdly, I argue that liberalism must rely on at least one partial comprehensive doctrine, namely, the value of autonomous choice. I conclude that the burdens of judgement argument does not demonstrate that liberalism cannot be based on comprehensive moral foundations.