The philosophy of economic modelling: a critical survey

Economic modelling, the heart of orthodox economics, has long been accused of neglecting the interpretation of its models needed to generate knowledge claims about the real world. It is argued that recent developments in the philosophy of model and theory can help us to evaluate the scientific and policy relevance of economic models. McCloskey's attempt to finesse this issue by reference to the rhetoric of economics is argued not to be congruent with economics' revealed explanatory and policy objectives. Blaug's adherence to a Popper-Lakatos mode of appraisal may be a little dated, but none of the more recent approaches to the metaphysical foundations of economics—such as scientific realism, constructive empiricism or 'causal holism'—seem able to rebuff the criticism explicit and implicit in the recent work of, for example, Hausman and Rosenberg. An example of 'modelling without theory' and Rapport's recent defence of economic modelling's practice suggest the need for further detailed evaluation by case-studies of the development and application of economic models.