Reconceptualizing the Transitive Inference Ability: A Framework for Existing and Future Research

It has often been claimed that to demonstrate transitive inference is to demonstrate a logical ability, and by implication that transitivity as a property is generally a logical entity. Both claims are considered using a theoretically driven analysis together with consideration of relevant existing experimental research and some newly reported findings. This approach suggests an account of transitivity and transitive inferential reasoning that differs not only from the classic Piagetian account, but also from the information processing account so dominant today. We begin by considering one important issue, that the “logical” definitional criterion can only be approached if individuals are required to demonstrate a capacity for transitive inference that is discriminative in nature. This, together with interpretation of findings from existing transitive tasks, leads to the postulate of a three-component psychological system, with the components relying on perceptual, linguistic, and conceptual subprocesses and sensitivity to simple cues. The framework is testable and accommodates important aspects of classic and modern accounts of “transitive development” that until now have been taken to be mutually exclusive. It also readily accommodates both human and nonhuman research, yet neither a formal logical structure nor memory in any general sense need be assigned the primary role.