The small improvement argument |
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Authors: | Nicolas Espinoza |
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Affiliation: | 1. Department of Language and Culture, Lule? University of Technology, Lulea, 97187, Sweden
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Abstract: | It is commonly assumed that moral deliberation requires that the alternatives available in a choice situation are evaluatively comparable. This comparability assumption is threatened by claims of incomparability, which is often established by means of the small improvement argument (SIA). In this paper I argue that SIA does not establish incomparability in a stricter sense. The reason is that it fails to distinguish incomparability from a kind of evaluative indeterminacy which may arise due to the vagueness of the evaluative comparatives ‘better than,’ ‘worse than,’ and ‘equally as good as.’ |
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Keywords: | Value relations Incomparability Small improvement argument Vagueness |
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