Logical Truth and Tarskian Logical Truth |
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Authors: | Gómez-torrente Mario |
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Affiliation: | (1) Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México México D.F, 04510, Mexico |
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Abstract: | This paper examines the question of the extensional correctness of Tarskian definitions of logical truth and logical consequence. I identify a few different informal properties which are necessary for a sentence to be an informal logical truth and look at whether they are necessary properties of Tarskian logical truths. I examine arguments by John Etchemendy and Vann McGee to the effect that some of those properties are not necessary properties of some Tarskian logical truths, and find them unconvincing. I stress the point that since the hypothesis that Tarski's definitions are extensionally correct is deeply entrenched, the burden of proof is still on the shoulders of Tarski's critics, who have not lifted the burden. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. |
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