Varieties of Objectivity: Reply to De Mesel |
| |
Authors: | Mario Brandhorst |
| |
Institution: | Georg‐August‐Universit?t G?ttingen, Philosophisches Seminar, G?ttingen |
| |
Abstract: | In a previous paper, I argued that the later Wittgenstein did not endorse a realist account of ethics, where a realist account is understood to involve a claim to truth as well as objectivity. In this paper, I respond to a number of critical questions that Benjamin De Mesel raises about that interpretation. I agree with him that just as there are uses for expressions such as “truth”, “fact” and “reality” in ethics, there are uses for expressions such as “objectivity” that do not involve a deeper realist commitment. But I uphold and reinforce my claim that objectivity in ethics as the realist conceives it is ruled out by Wittgenstein, who describes the correspondence between ethical expressions and reality in an entirely different way. |
| |
Keywords: | |
|
|