Information and Closure |
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Authors: | Fred Dretske |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Philosophy, Duke University, Building 90, Rm 91-C, Durham, North Carolina 27708-0743, USA |
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Abstract: | Peter Baumann and Nicholas Shackel defend me against a serious criticism by Christoph J?ger. They argue that my account of information is consistent with my denial of closure for knowledge. Information isn’t closed under known entailment either. I think that, technically speaking, they are right. But the way they are right doesn’t help me much in my effort to answer the skeptic. I describe a way in which information, like knowledge, fails to be closed in a way that makes an information-based account of knowledge an effective tool in answering the skeptic. |
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