Representationalism and Husserlian Phenomenology |
| |
Authors: | Email author" target="_blank">Michael?K?ShimEmail author |
| |
Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy, California State University Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90032, USA |
| |
Abstract: | According to contemporary representationalism, phenomenal qualia—of specifically sensory experiences—supervene on representational
content. Most arguments for representationalism share a common, phenomenological premise: the so-called “transparency thesis.”
According to the transparency thesis, it is difficult—if not impossible—to distinguish the quality or character of experiencing
an object from the perceived properties of that object. In this paper, I show that Husserl would react negatively to the transparency
thesis; and, consequently, that Husserl would be opposed to at least two versions of contemporary representationalism. First,
I show that Husserl would be opposed to strong representationalism, since he believes the cognitive content of a perceptual episode can vary despite constancy of sensory
qualia. Second, I then show that Husserl would be opposed to weak representationalism, since he believes that sensory qualia—specifically, the sort that he calls “kinesthetic sensations”—can
vary despite constancy in representational content. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|