The person in the mirror: Using the enfacement illusion to investigate the experiential structure of self-identification |
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| Institution: | 1. Department of Psychology, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, Surrey TW20 0EX, UK;2. Department of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck, University of London, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HX, UK;1. Department of Psychology, University of Hertfordshire, Hatfield, Hertfordshire, UK;2. Department of Neuroscience, Karolinska Institute, Sweden;1. School of Psychology, University of Sussex, UK;2. Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science, UK;3. Brighton and Sussex Medical School, UK;1. Lab of Action & Body, Department of Psychology, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, Surrey, UK;2. Department of Experimental Psychology, Ghent University, Belgium;1. Department of Psychology, University of Delaware, United States;2. Department of Neurology, Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Pennsylvania, United States;3. Department of Psychology, Haverford College, United States;1. Lab of Action & Body, Department of Psychology, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, Surrey TW20 0EX, UK;2. Department of Political Science, Communication, Engineering and Information Technologies, University of Sassari, 07100 Sassari, Italy;1. Università degli studi di Milano Bicocca, Department of Psychology, Piazza Ateneo Nuovo 1, Milano 20126, Italy;2. Center for Neuroprosthethics, School of Life Sciences, Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Station 19, Lausanne CH-1015, Switzerland;3. Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience, Brain Mind Institute, School of Life Sciences, Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Station 19, Lausanne CH-1015, Switzerland |
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| Abstract: | How do we acquire a mental representation of our own face? Recently, synchronous, but not asynchronous, interpersonal multisensory stimulation (IMS) between one’s own and another person’s face has been used to evoke changes in self-identification (enfacement illusion). We investigated the conscious experience of these changes with principal component analyses (PCA) that revealed that while the conscious experience during synchronous IMS focused on resemblance and similarity with the other’s face, during asynchronous IMS it focused on multisensory stimulation. Analyses of the identified common factor structure revealed significant quantitative differences between synchronous and asynchronous IMS on self-identification and perceived similarity with the other’s face. Experiment 2 revealed that participants with lower interoceptive sensitivity experienced stronger enfacement illusion. Overall, self-identification and body-ownership rely on similar basic mechanisms of multisensory integration, but the effects of multisensory input on their experience are qualitatively different, possibly underlying the face’s unique role as a marker of selfhood. |
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