Mental colors,conceptual overlap,and discriminating knowledge of particulars |
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| Institution: | 1. University of Tunis El Manar, National Engineering School (ENIT), LTSIRS Laboratory, BP 37 Le Bélvédère, 1002 Tunis, Tunisia;2. University Paris-Est Créteil (UPEC), LiSSi, EA 3956, 122 rue Paul Armangot, 94400 Vitry sur Seine, France;1. Key Laboratory of Bio-Resource and Eco-Environment of Ministry of Education, College of Life Sciences, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610065, Sichuan, China;2. Sichuan Key Laboratory of Conservation Biology on Endangered Wildlife, College of Life Sciences, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610065, Sichuan, China;3. Institute for Advanced Study, Chengdu University, Chengdu, Sichuan 610106, China |
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| Abstract: | I respond to the separate commentaries by Jacob Berger, Charlie Pelling, and David Pereplyotchik on my paper, “Color-Consciousness Conceptualism.” I resist Berger’s suggestion that mental colors ever enter consciousness without accompaniment by deployments of concepts of their extra-mental counterparts. I express concerns about Pelling’s proposal that a more uniform conceptualist treatment of phenomenal sorites can be gained by a simple appeal to the partial overlap of the extensions of some concepts. I question the relevance to perceptual consciousness of the arguments for demonstrative concepts that Pereplyotchik attacks. |
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